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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
JOHN FRANK PACE, and MILTON
E. HANSEN,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
13606

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendants John Frank Pace and Milton E. Hansen
appeal their conviction for the crimes of burglary in the
second degree and grand larceny.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Defendants were convicted by a jury of the crimes
of burglary in the second degree and grand larceny in
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah. Defendants were sentenced to
serve an indeterminate term as provided by law.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the conviction of
the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Upon entering the Intermountain Farmer's Association building at 1800 South West Temple, Salt Lake City,
Utah, on or about the 14th day of March, 1973, Frank
John Pace and Milton Edgar Hansen stole property in
excess of fifty dollars from said Association. These actions were in violation of Title 76, Chapter 9, Sec. 3 and
Title 76, Chapter 38, Sees. 1 and 4, Utah Code Ann.
(1953).
Entrance was accomplished by forcing open the large
double doors on the south side of the building (T. 98-99).
Once inside of the building a glass door leading to the
office was broken and an unsuccessful attempt to open
the office safe had been made (T. 46-47). Investigating
officers also found several damp footprints in the office
and warehouse section of the building in addition to
tracks leading through the snow from a broken window
to the fence encircling the immediate area (T. 44). Both
appellants were arrested by police officers within this
fenced area near the southwest corner of the yeard (T.
43-44).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED
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DEFENDANT HANSEN'S MOTION FOR
SEVERANCE, THERE BEING NO INDICATION THAT EITHER APPELLANT WOULD
BE UNDULY PREJUDICED BY THE DENIAL.
Contrary to appellants' statement, this Court has
set forth the criteria that must be met in order to obtain
a severance pursuant to Section 77-31-6, Utah Code Ann.
(1953). This standard was enunciated in the case of
State v. Miller, 111 Utah 255, 177 P. 2d 727 (1947), and
reaffirmed subsequently in State v. Rivenburgh, 11 Utah
2d 95, 355 P. 2d 689, cert, den., 368 U. S. 922, 76 Ed. 2d
137, 82 S. Ct. 246 (1960); State v. Faulkner, 23 Utah 2d
257, 461 P. 2d 470 (1969); State v. Langley, 25 Utah 2d
24, 474 P. 2d 737 (1970); and requires that there be a
showing of prejudice or unfairness as a result of the trial
court's denial of said motion. See State v. Miller, supra,
at 728 and State v. Langley, supra, at 31. Respondent
asserts that the trial transcript does not contain the required prejudice or unfairness. At the time the motion
was made by defense counsel on behalf of defendant Hansen, it was alleged that severance was necessary because
of certain statements made by co-defendant Pace which,
if introduced at trial, would severely prejudice defendant
Hansen. At this point, attorney for the State of Utah
Herschel Bullen stated that no such statement would be
introduced in the course of the presentation of the State's
case (T. 3). The trial court then correctly determined
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that Mr. Hansen would not be prejudiced and correctly
denied the motion (T. 4).
A further examination of the record fails to reveal
any of the prejudicial unfairness which would warrant
reversal by this court. In appellant Hansen's own brief
the only prejudice presented takes the form of self-serving hypotheticals.
There being no evidence or showing of prejudice, the
trial court correctly denied appellants' motion for severance.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING THE JURY TO HEAR AND CONSIDER
TESTIMONY WHICH WAS ADMISSIBLE.
A. THE TESTIMONY WAS NOT EVIDENCE OF ANOTHER CRIME.
An examination of the transcript of Trial (T. I l l )
reveals that a lock pick was discovered on the person of
Mr. Milton Hansen by the investigating officer. As a
witness, this officer, reading from his police report, detailed the various items found in the possession of appellant and, upon the request of the court, the witness spelled
out the word, lock pick. Subsequently, the witness was
asked by Mr. Bullen, prosecuting attorney, to describe
and explain the uses of a lock pick (T. 111). Such testimony was considered admissible by the trial court (T.
112) and this testimony does not constitute reversible
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error whether or not counsel presented correct grounds
for an objection at trial.
Unfortunately, from the obscure language used to
construct appellants' own self-serving interpretation on
this testimony it, at least, becomes clear that appellants
seriously misread State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P.
2d 512 (1968). In Poe, grisly colored slides of the deceased in a trial charging first degree murder were admitted into evidence. The case was reversed and remanded. Because, in the court's words ". . . The slides
could very well have tipped the scales in favor of the
death penalty . . . and because of the other doubtful aspects of the trial . . ." Poe says nothing about the inadmissibility of the kind of testimony involved in the instant case.
Similarly, appellants' attempt to create a conclusionany inference from the testimony offered at trial shows
an inaccurate citation of Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-205
(1953); which section deals with the elements of criminal
homicide that are of course, not at issue. Even if Section
76-9-8, dealing with the possession of burglarious tools
were cited by appellants, the thrust of such an argument
would be inappropriate since the prosecution made no
indication, either articulated or implied, that the testimony concerned with the pick lock involved a charge
pursuant to Section 76-9-8.
State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 P. 1071 (1915),
articulating the standard, states:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"Under our jurisprudence men may be tried
only for the specific crime with which they stand
charged. All other crimes . . . which the accused
may have committed or contemplated are irrelevant and may not be shown against him."
This well-settled law was not violated in appellants' trial,
as is clearly shown in the transcript of the proceedings.
Appellants were not charged with any violation of Section 76-9-8 and the testimony concerning the lock pick
was admissible in that such a device is commonly used
in the furtherance of the crimes of burglary in the second
degree and grand larceny that appellants were charged
with. In State v. Cox, 74 Utah 149, 277 P. 972 (1929),
the evidence therein established that defendant had made
sales of wheat at approximately the same time that wheat
had been stolen was held to have been erroneously admitted but was not a reversible error. Consequently,
appellants' argument for reversal inadequately based on
the authority of either Anselmo or Cox.
Further, the citations of State v. Johnson, 25 Utah
2d 160, 478 P. 2d 491 (1970), and State v. Dickenson, 12
Utah 2d 8, 361 P. 2d 412 (1961), cited by appellants, are
superfluous since appellants have failed to establish that
the testimony relevant to the lock pick was designed to
"disgrace" the defendant as a person of evil character
with the propensity to commit crime" (Brief of Appellant,
p. 7). In Johnson, supra, admission of policeman's testimony was held not to be prejudicial error because it was
offered, similar to the testimony concerning the lock pick
in the instant as an integral part of evidence relevant to
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the charge on which defendant was being tried. Consonant with the holding of Dickenson, supra, that evidence
concerning other crimes is not admissible to disgrace defendant or "primarily for the purpose of creating in the
minds of the jurors the impression that the defendant
had a propensity to commit crime . . . ," (Brief of Appellant at p. 7), the trial court in the present case did not
allow the testimony to disgrace the defendant. Since
appellants neither show that the testimony is irrelevant
to the charged crimes nor that the testimony presented
was an endeavor to disparage appellants, appellants' argument on these grounds is without merit.
B. THE TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE
POSSESSION OF CERTAIN TOOLS BY
APPELLANT WAS NOT INFLAMMATORY SINCE THEY WERE MATERIAL
TO THE CRIME CHARGED.
In the Transcript of Trial (T. 39), the witness states
that:
"As we approached the office area I could see
that the glass was broken in the door. The door
is taped with a steel tape. It's a burglar alarm
that I have seen previously when I have been
there."
In addition, the Transcript of Trial (T. 98, 99) indicates
that a door to the building had been forced open. In both
instances the glass cutter and the lock pick may have
been used in the furtherance of the charged crimes. From
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the evidence available one cannot be certain that the tools
mentioned were actually utilized. However, from this it
may be reasonably conjectured that the tools were not
in fact used in the effort to enter the building and that
entry was made ". . . by breaking out a window and by
kicking down doors" (App. Brief at p. 8).
Appellants' citation of State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295,
350 P. 2d 756 (1960); People v. Flanagan, 65 Cal. App. 2d
371, 150 P. 2d 927 (1944); and People v. Howard, 10 Cal.
App. 2d 258, 52 P. 2d 283 (1935),only serves to further
confuse the issues involved. Rather than showing that
the lock pick or the glass cutter were not an integral part
of the res gestae of the charged crimes (see Jones, On
Evidence, Vol. 2, Sec. 318-320), hence inadmissible, the
sitation of Little, supra, only shows a confusion of the
critical distinction between the acceptable parameters
of a witness's testimony and the permissible limits for
exhibits used as evidence. The Court in Little, supra,
held that the introduction of a blackjack and bicycle
sprocket chain fashioned into a blackjack taken from defendant's automobile were inadmissible since their presence in the automobile were " . . . irrelevant to any proper
issue and served in no way to explain the circumstances
of the crimes." The holding in Howard is in accord with
the Court in Little. Indeed, the Court in Planagan, supra,
articulates acceptable boundaries within which the trial
court in the instant case operated.
"Tools and instruments of crime found in the
possession or under the control of defendant soon
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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after the commission of the offense may be offered in evidence whenver they constitute a link
in the chain of circumstances which tend to
connect him with the commission of the offense
charged."
Both State v. Filacchione, 136 Mont. 238, 347 P. 2d
1000 (1960), and State v. Crawford, 60 Utah 6, 206 P.
717 (1922), fail to duplicate the factual conditions obtaining in the instant case; consequently, the points of
law contained therein are inapplicable. In the former
case the Court did allow those tools into evidence, ". . .
since they were in defendant's possession when found,"
and in the latter, the .32 and .38 caliber cartridges were
not admitted given that the weapon used in the course
of the robbery was a .45 Colt revolver. Moreover, the
general position of the Court in Anselmo, supra, mentioned above is in no way threatened by the procedure
of the trial court in admitting the testimony concerning
the lock pick and the glass cutter. The charge that the
testimony concerning the lock pick and glass cutter was
inflammatory is simply not sustained on the authority
of these cited cases.
Since there is a clear distinction between the admissibility of evidence in the form of exhibits and the admissibility of testimony of a witness, the analogy forged by
the appellants between the hunting knife as Exhibit 17
(T. 164) and the testimony of the witness cxmcerning
the lock pick and glass cutter is spurious. Given the
inappropriate character of this analogy, the inference of
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prejudicial error is unwarranted as is the citation of
State v. Lewis, 8 Utah 2d 224, 332 P. 2d 664 (1958).
POINT III.
THE COURT'S FAILURE TO GRANT DEFENDANT HANSEN'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE GRAND LARCENY COUNT AT
THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE WAS
NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR AS TO BOTH
THE BURGLARY AND THE GRAND LARCENY COUNTS.
A. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
TO ALLOW THE GRAND LARCENY
COUNT TO GO TO THE JURY.
Contrary to the suggestion of appellants, the trial
court acted lawfully when a motion to dismiss the grand
larceny charge was denied. On the basis of selections
from the Transcript of Trial appellants seek to show that
the theft of the saddles upon which action the grand
larceny charge was predicated did not take place. Such
a suggestion is based upon the content of the testimony
of a witness, Mr. Lewis, who supposedly ". . . did not
then or at any time testify that three saddles or any
saddles were missing," (Brief of App. at p. 12).
Such a suggestion might only be made if a willful distortion is made of specific statements as well as the commonplace meaning normally derived from the general
comments made throughout the trial concerning the dis-
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appearance of the saddles. An example of such an egregious distortion of a specific statement is found in appellants statement that, "At one point, the witness Lewis
testified that there was a knife lying on a bag of feed
next to the saddles (emphasis) on the 14th day of March,
1973" (App. Brief at p. 13). However, an examination
of the Transcript of Trial (T. 124) discloses that Mr.
Lewis corrected himself as he says, "Also I noticed another box — it was the same type of box — laying over
on a bag of feed right next to the saddles, saddle tree."
It is apparent from this utterance alone that Mr. Lewis
was referring to the "saddle tree" rather than the saddles.
From the context of the transcript pertaining to the
saddles, it is readily apparent that not only did the prosecution understand the saddles to be missing but also the
defense as well as the court. The discussion concerning
the value of the missing saddles, especially the voir dire
examination by appellants' counsel is based on the uncontested belief that the saddles had been stolen (T. 131132). During the entire course of this discussion objection questions this belief was not raised by appellants'
counsel, Mr. Hill, and there was no objection raised by
Mr. Hill when a definite statement concerning the number of saddles missing was indicated (T. 123).
"Q. Okay. Did you notice those saddles
there on the 13th?
A. Yes, they were there. They were on the
saddle tree, just for saddles.
Q. Four saddles there on the 13th?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A. Yes."
After a sustained effort by appellants' counsel to
prevent the witness from stating the value of the missing
saddles (T. 125-133), the witness finally clearly states:
"A. The saddles were always in the two
hundred dollar range, very close to two hundred
dollars in value (T. 133).
The Court: Overruled. I don't know what
your two hundred dollars refers to. One of them,
two of them, or three of them.
The Witness: Two hundred dollars each."
According to the testimony of the witness, Mr. Lewis,
the saddles had been taken from the immediate area of
the building; the recovery of those saddles was not effected
in order to mark them for identification purposes. Needless to say, it is not uncommon for stolen items to escape
recovery by authorities. Because the witness also observed depressed and disturbed snow on both sides of
the fence, he reasoned that the saddles were thrown over
the fence in order to be taken away from the area (T.
155). To complain that appellants were disadvantaged
by virtue of the fact that an alternative witness could not
be called to appraise the saddles which were unavailable
as exhibits is to raise a moot complaint.
Therefore, on the strength of the evidence submitted
at trial the grand larceny conviction should be affirmed.
B. THE SUBMISSION OF THE GRAND
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LARCENY COUNT TO THE JURY WAS
NOT IMPROPER AS A MATTER OF
LAW.
In the court's comment to the jury it is made clear
that the evidence tendered by the State was circumstantial evidence (T. 219).
"The Court: This is drcumstantial evidence. Nobody saw the saddles go out. And
you may consider all the evidence surrounding
the event, that they were there the day before
and they weren't there the next morning . . . "
Unfortunately, the citation of State v. Potello, 40 Utah
56, 68,119 P. 1023,1028 (1911), neither helps to establish
the correct grounds upon which the jury based its verdict
nor does it show that the grand larceny conviction of
appellants was an unlawful inference on an inference.
Obviously, an interview with the jurors would be necessary to establish the reasons for their decision, neither
conjectures nor case citation will establish this.
Whale Potello, supra, does indeed reiterate the uncontested rule of law that "one presumption or inference
cannot rest upon another mere inference or presumption
. . . (But) . . . can only rest on proven facts;" the details
of this case make impossible the application of this rule
to the instant case. In Potello, no evidence was submitted
to show that the defendant took the horse from the owner's corral. Since there existed another very plausible
hypothesis to explain the disappearance of the horse, viz.,
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that the horse strayed out of the corral, the lack of evidence was in light of the "recent possession" statute
(Comp. Law 1907, Sec. 4355) was insufficient to warrant
a conviction.
But appellants' case does not illustrate a violation
of this rule of law endorsed by the court in Potello primarily because a plausible hypothesis as an alternate
explanation was not offered. Horses may stray from the
confines of their corrals but saddles commonly remain
stationary until moved by another. Consequently, because appellants' argument is based on a tenuous construction of the jury's method of decision-making and
because the cited case of Potello, supra, is factually irrelevan to appellants' case, the conviction of the trial court
should be affirmed.
POINT IV.
THERE EXISTED NO JURY MISCONDUCT WHICH DEPRIVED APPELLANTS
OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
TRIAL BY JURY.
A right to trial by jury is a guaranteed fundamental
right by the United States Constitution and by Article I,
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. It is not guaranteed that jurors will, at all times, remain entirely alert.
Despite any reference that one or two jurors had lapsed
into a state of drowsiness on several occasions during the
course of the trial (T. 96, 206-216), it is obvious that
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this conduct would not breach the constitutional guarantee of a right to a trial by jury afforded appellants.
Undeniably, a sleeping state may be thought to obliterate immediate sense perceptions, but to imply, as appellants do at page 18, that the entire jury could not hear
the evidence because of the slumber of one or two is
without merit. As a result, appellants' further implication, ipso facto, that their Constitutional rights were
denied is equally without merit.
The cited case of State v. Morgan, 23 Utah 212, 64
P. 356 (1901), is used to suggest that the dozing of the
jurors was prejudicial to appellants. However, Morgan,
supra, raises the issue of the veracity at voir dire in that
two jurors prior to trial had allegedly made statements
to persons indicating bias against defendant. It is this
kind of substantial issue which gives rise to that court's
statement as quoted by Appellant at p. 19. Since the
issue governing the court's statement concerning prejudice to a defendant turns on the crucial point of veracity
at voir dire, the application of Morgan, supra, cannot be
made to appellants' argument.
As cited by appellants, the line of case represented
by State v. Jones, 187 Kan. 496, 357 P. 2d 760 (1960);
Hall v. State, 223 Md. 158, 162 A. 2d 751 (1960); State
v. Mellor, 73 Utah 104, 272 P. 635 (1928), supports the
proposition that dozing on the part of the jurors is not
prejudicial to a defendant, hence is not considered jury
misconduct of a magnitude to warrant a reversal. In
Mellor, supra, for example, it was held that although a
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juror had fallen asleep several times in the course of the
trial, this fact did not require a new trial Moreover, the
lanugage of Mellor, supra, makes it clear that any questions of a juror's misconduct is within the discretion of
the trial court and is subject to review only upon a clear
showing of an abuse of that discretion. Thus, in the absence of these conditions necessary for reversal, the conviction should be sustained.
POINT V.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS RESPONSE TO THE JURY AFTER DELIBERATIONS HAD BEGUN.
A. AN INSPECTION OF THE RECORD
FOR APPELLANTS' TRIAL SHOWS
THAT INSTRUCTION NO. 5-C DEALING WITH THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND DIRECT EVIDENCE WAS SUBMITTED
TO THE JURY IN WRITING PURSUANT TO RULE 51, UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE (R. 261). IN ADDITION, WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS
NO. 9 AND NO. 10 WERE GIVEN IN
COMPLIANCE WITH THE PORTION
OF THIS RULE 51.
"The court shall not comment on the evidence in
the case, and if the court states any of the eviDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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denoe, it must instruct the jury that they are
the exclusive judges of all questions of fact."
In so doing, the court acted in accord with Utah Code
Ann. § 77-31-1(5) which requires that, "when the evidence is concluded the court must charge the jury as in
civil actions."
Although Instruction 4-C was given to the jury in
writing, the Transcript of Trial shows that the jurors
desired some clarification of this specific instruction (T.
217). This jury request generated the oral response
offered by the court as recorded on 218-219 of the Transcript of Trial. Such a response to an inquiry made by
the jurors after the commencement of their deliberations
is clearly covered by Rule 47 (N) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure:
"After the jury have retired for deliberation, if
there is a disagreement among them as to any
part of the testimony, or if they desire to be
informed on any point of law arising in the
cause, they may require the officer to conduct
them into court. Upon being brought into court
the information required must be given in the
presence of, or after notice to, the parties or
counsel. Such information must be given in
in writing or taken down by the reporter."
Since the response of the court was noted by the court
reporter, the requisite conditions of this rule were met.
Thus, the cases cited as State v. Aikers, 87 Utah 507, 51
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P. 2d 1052 (1935), and Kurtz v. Nelson, 94 Utah 185, 76
P. 2d 577 (1938), are inappropriate. Given that the instructions given by the court were neither inconsistent
or contradictory. The holding of State v. Waid, 92 Utah
297, 67 P. 2d 647 (1937), is equally irrelevant to appellant's argument.
B. THE INSTRUCTION WAS A CORRECT
STATEMENT OF THE LAW CONCERNING THE USE OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.
The holding of State v. Merritt, 67 Utah 325, 247 P.
497 (1926), is essentially contained within the context
of Instruotion No. 13 (R. 272), as provided by the court
during appellants' trial. To warrant conviction under
the holding of Merritt, supra, the circumstantial evidence
must convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that
all facts and circumstances are true and are incompatiible
with any reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of
the accused.
Moreover, Instruction No. 14 states:
"These instructions are to be considered altogether as a whole, and not as if each instruction
were a complete statement of the law by itself.
And even though a rule, direction or thought is
stated in different ways and repeated in more
than one instruction you should not give it undue emphasis and ignore others. But you should
consider all of the instructions as a whole and
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apply them all to the evidence in light of all of
the instructions" (R. 273).
This instruction corresponds in all substantial matters
to the holdings in sustaining similar instructions rendered
in State v. Laub, 102 Utah 402, 131 P. 2d 805 (1942);
State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P. 2d 285 (1941); and
State v. Judd, 74 Utah 398, 279 P. 953 (1929). The court
in Judd makes it clear that a court is not required to
charge that every circumstance constituting a link in the
chain of evidence must be consistent with defendant's
guilt and inconsistent with his innocence. Rather, the
overall circumstances are to be considered with other
related facts so that the conclusion reached by the jury
is founded on the entire fabric of evidence presented. It
is this position which is endorsed by the courts in both
Laub, supra, and Erwin, supra, and embodied in the instructions given by the court during appellants' trial.
Owing to the difference in factual content and the
proper instructions given by the court to the jury germane to circumstantial evidence, appellants' argument
based on State v. Hutchings, 30 Utah 319, 84 P. 893
(1906), as well as that based on State v. Burch, 100 Utah
414, 115 P. 2d 911 (1941), are insufficiently grounded.
The former case presents one with circumstantial evidence of the most fragile sort, including the highly fanciful suggestion of one witness that one hundred sixteen
live chickens were quietly hidden under a few blankets
in a buggy. Faced with this kind of transparent evidence,
the court there laid down this general rule:
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"Under the law it was incumbent upon the jury
to acquit the defendant, if the evidence, relied
upon, could be reconciled upon any reasonable
hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the
defendant. Especially is this rule applicable,
where, as here it is sought to convict the accused
wholly upon circumstantial evidence, and where
the circumstances leave the mind in grave doubt
as to the commission of the offense."
Insofar as the factual circumstances and quantum of
evidence of Burch, supra, is similar to Hutchings, supra,
the gravity of doubt as to the commission of the charged
offense in these two cases simply does not appear in the
trial of the appellants. Because the cited cases are inapplicable to appellants' argument and because the instructions given by the court were correct statements
according to law, their conviction should stand.
C. THE INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY
WAS A PROPER COMMENT ON THE
EVIDENCE AND DID NOT MISLEAD
THE JURY.
The question apparently presented by appellants
goes to whether or not the court during appellants' trial
imposed its interpretation of the evidence upon the jury.
A careful review of the significant portions of the Transcript of Trial does not in any way point to a violation
of Article 1, Sec. 12 of the Utah Constitution (See especially T. 218-221) as a comment on guilt or innocence.
Rather than telling ". . . them the saddles had been
taken," or, strongly inferring "that the defendants had
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done the taking," (Brief of Appellants at p. 31), the
court, solicitous of the jurors' inquiries, attempted to
answer the questions as succinctly as possible.
The cases of State v. Seymour, 49 Utah 285, 163 P.
789 (1917); State v. Greene, 33 Utah 497, 94 P. 987
(1908); State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P. 2d 177 (1931);
and State v. Harris, 1 Utah 2d 182, 264 P. 284 (1953),
support the appellants' contention that a trial court
should not comment on the nature of the evidence to the
extent that it encroaches upon the lawful duty of the
jury to evaluate this evidence. The cases are, however,
inappropriate to the instant as the court's comments did
not go to guilt or innocence and therefore were not an
unlawful elision of the jurors' proper function.
The state of affairs in the Seymour case, supra, giving cause for the dicta recorded in the Brief of AppeUant
at P. 27, is encapsulated in the following quotation:
"Quote apart from the fact that at least one,
and possibly two, of the representations set forth
in the information did not relate to an existing
fact, or to existing facts, the charge is faulty."
Hence, the presence of counter factuals in the jury instructions obviated the charge to the jury. Similarly, the
court in Harris, supra, committed a prejudicial error by
obviously stating an evaluation of the evidence which
was also done in Green, supra, and limiting jury's deliberations to whether the record of prior conviction was
authentic. This was not the case during appellant's trial.
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Because the Transcript of Trial clearly establishes in
the instant that the court, during appellants' trial, did
not introduce the jury to material facte not admitted ait
trial, the citation of Green, supra, becomes an enipty
exercise.
CONCLUSION
From a consideration of these data, the judgment;
of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
M. REID RUSSELL
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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